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Whealon v. Sterling, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 66 (September 22, 2005)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT 
 
Summary 
 Appellant agent sought review of a summary judgment from the Eighth Judicial 
District Court, which ruled in favor of respondent entertainer in a contract dispute. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 Reversed.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that although the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting leave for the respondent to amend his complaint, the 
ruling of the district court was in contravention of the plain meaning of the applicable 
Nevada Revised Statute. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Respondent, Dean Sterling, performed an X-rated stage show.  Sterling and 
appellant, Robert Whealon, entered into an oral contract whereby Whealon alleges that he 
agreed to be the show's agent in exchange for twenty percent of the gross receipts.  
Sterling contends that the agreement was for a twelve percent promoter's fee, plus an 
agent fee of three percent. 
 While acting as Sterling’s agent, Whealon found a new venue for the show.  This 
new venue was structured as a lounge lease agreement. Under the agreement, Sterling 
paid the rent for the lounge space and produced the show but otherwise operated as a 
separate entity from the hotel.  In fact, the hotel paid no wages to Sterling. 
 Although Sterling paid Whealon a fifteen percent fee between June and 
November 1999, Whealon brought suit against him for unpaid fees, seeking the 
difference between the twenty percent agent fee he asserts they orally agreed to and the 
fifteen percent fee he received. Whealon repeatedly claimed that he was the show's agent, 
but he admitted during the proceeding that he had never applied for an employment 
agency license from the Nevada Labor Commissioner.  
 “In his initial answer and cross-complaint, Sterling failed to raise a violation of 
the private employment agencies statutes as an affirmative defense.”2  “He was later 
granted leave to file an amended answer and cross-complaint, which included an 
affirmative defense based on Whealon's failure to secure an employment agency license 
under the statutes.”3  Thereafter, Sterling moved for summary judgment. 
 The district court granted summary judgment to Sterling, finding that Whealon 
had violated the statutory licensing requirements for private employment agencies, 
thereby rendering the oral agreement unenforceable. Whealon appealed. 
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Discussion 
A. Abuse of Discretion 
 Whealon first argued that the district court abused its discretion by granting 
Sterling’s motion to amend his pleadings in order to raise a previously omitted 
affirmative defense. 
 The Nevada Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.  NRCP 8(c) requires that all affirmative defenses be raised in the pleadings, 
stating in pertinent part, “a party shall set forth affirmatively…any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”  An affirmative defense not raised in 
the pleadings is normally deemed waived4 unless the opposing party is given “reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to respond.”5  The notice and opportunity to respond 
requirements may be satisfied if the opposing party is given time to file a response to a 
motion to amend the pleadings.6 
 In this case, Whealon was given the opportunity to respond to Sterling’s motion to 
amend the pleadings.  Further, Whealon failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting 
from the amendment. 
 
B. Interpretation of Employment Statute 
 Whealon next argued that it was error for the district court to grant summary 
judgment because the private employment agencies statutes are limited to employment 
resulting in the traditional employer-employee relationship and do not apply to 
independent contracts or leases. 
 The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Whealon.  NRS 611.030 prohibits an 
employment agency from conducting business in Nevada without a license.  NRS 
611.020(2), which is part of the private employment agency statutes, defines 
“employment agency” as a person who, for a charge, “furnishes information to a person” 
seeking employment or employees.   
 Although the statutes do not define the terms “employment” or “employ,” the 
court concluded that the plain meaning of the term “employment” applies to individuals 
who perform services in exchange for wages, salary, or commissions. 
 In this case, the court concluded that Whealon did not furnish information to 
persons seeking “employment” but rather arranged an agreement by which Sterling was 
able to enter into a lease agreement with the hotel to perform his show. 
 
Conclusion 
 The court found that while the amount of compensation required under the oral 
agreement is disputed, summary judgment was improperly granted to Sterling because 
Whealon was not subject to the licensing requirements of Nevada’s private employment 
agency statutes.  The decision of the district court was reversed and the matter remanded 
for further proceedings. 
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